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Abstract—On the Internet of Things (IoT), devices continu-
ously communicate with each other, with a gateway, or other
Internet nodes. Often devices are constrained and use insecure
channels for their communication, which exposes them to a se-
lection of attacks that may extract sensitive pieces of information
or manipulate dialogues for the purpose of sabotaging.
This paper presents a new layer in the RIOT networking ar-
chitecture to seamlessly integrate secure communication between
applications using DTLS. The layer acts as a modular abstraction
layer of the different DTLS implementations, enabling swapping
of the underlying implementation with just a few lines of code.
This paper also introduces credman, a new module to manage
credentials used for (D)TLS connections.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is an important part when communicating through
the Internet. Despite the fact that without proper security prac-
tices, bad actors could break into our network infrastructures
and cause severe damage to parties involved, there are still
numerous devices, IoT appliances in particular, that expose
themselves on the Internet without having any proper security
measures in place.
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [1] is a protocol
for traffic encryption on top of UDP [2]. It is based on
the concepts of TLS [3] and provides equivalent security
guarantees. DTLS guarantees reliable transport during the
handshake process but maintains UDP transport properties
during application data transfer. The protocol is deliberately
designed to be as similar to TLS as possible, both to minimize
new security inventions and to maximize the amount of code
and infrastructure reuse.
RIOT [4] is an open source real-time OS, based on a
modular architecture built around a lightweight micro-kernel,
and developed by a worldwide community of developers. The
modular approach enables easy prototyping and development
to test new ideas and deploy applications. Its default network
stack GNRC follows a cleanly layered, recursive design that
easily allows for stacking and exchanging protocol layers or
implementations.
In this paper, we describe how we built the DTLS ab-
straction layer on top of existing components in the RIOT
networking architecture. This layer provides an API that can be
implemented using third-party DTLS libraries. It is designed
to be independent of the underlying DTLS implementation,
therefore allows the DTLS stack to be exchanged without
altering the applications that uses it. We also introduce a new
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Fig. 1: RIOT networking stack
RIOT module credman to manage the credentials used for the
handshake.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section II, we introduce the existing networking stack of
RIOT. In Sections III, we describe the new secure network
stack, and Section IV presents experiments that assess its
performance. In Section V, we draw conclusions with an
outlook on future work.
II. RIOT NETWORKING SUBSYSTEM
The RIOT networking subsystem is designed to follow a
modular architecture with clean interfaces for abstracting all
layers [5]. This facilitates the creation and integration of new
protocols, different implementations, or additional layers such
as a new encryption layer to the existing stack. It consists
of the two external APIs netdev, sock, and a single internal
API for communication between layers, netapi. It is note-
worthy that the RIOT networking subsystem simultaneously
supports multiple interfaces with different protocol stacks,
which makes it capable of running gateway services. An
architectural overview is visualized in Figure 1.
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The Device Driver API: netdev. Individual network devices
in RIOT are abstracted via netdev, which allows networking
stacks access to the devices via a common, portable interface.
netdev remains neutral in that it does not enforce implementa-
tion details regarding memory allocation, data flattening, and
threading. These decisions are delegated to the users of the
interface.
The Internal Protocol Interface: netapi. Internal proto-
col layers in the RIOT networking subsystem can be re-
cursively composed via the netapi. The interface is kept
simple so that even an exotic networking protocol could
be implemented against it. Message passed between layers
are typed as following: two asynchronous message types
(MSG_TYPE_SND, MSG_TYPE_RCV) and two synchronous
message types (MSG_TYPE_GET, MSG_TYPE_SET) that
expects a reply in form of MSG_TYPE_ACK typed message.
No further semantic are built into the messages of netapi, but
certain preconditions on packets or option values handed to
netapi can be set as requirements to implement more complex
behavior that goes beyond these plain specification.
The User Programming API: sock. This module provides a
network API for applications and libraries in RIOT. It provides
a set of functions to establish connections or send and receive
datagrams using different types of protocols. In comparison to
POSIX sockets, sock does not require complex and memory
expensive implementation and therefore more suited for use
in constrained hardware. Only common type and definitions
from either libc or POSIX. This ensures that sock is easy to
port to other target OS.
GNRC is the native IPv6 networking stack for RIOT. It
takes full advantage of the multi-threading model supported
by RIOT to foster a clean protocol separation via well-defined
interfaces and IPC. Each network protocol is encapsulated
in its own thread and uses RIOT thread-targeted IPC with a
message queue in each thread to communicate between layers.
Other stacks that introduce different networking protocols
such as ICN also integrate via the same interfaces. Various
experimental evaluations and benchmarks [5], [6] have proven
the feasibility and efficiency of this flexible approach to
networking in RIOT.
III. INTRODUCING THE SECURE NETWORK STACK
The modular nature of the existing GNRC stack allows
for an easy extension by adding DTLS at the top while
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maintaining its modularity. We introduced two new modules
credman and sock dtls (see Figure 2).
credman is a module to manage credentials used in (D)TLS
encryption protocols. Credentials registered with the system
are identified by using the tuple of int-based tag cred-
man type t and the credential type credman tag t. This in
combination with the sock dtls API allows users to register
multiple credentials of the same type, which can be the case
if the nodes are communicating with multiple other nodes
simultaneously and each node uses different credentials for
authentication.
credman does not copy the credentials into the system
memory. It only has information about the credentials and
points to the location of the credential itself, which can be
stored in protected regions of the memory. Users will have to
ensure that a credential is available at the location given to
credman during the lifetime of their application.
We defined a new sock type — sock dtls. It is designed
to mimic the behavior of sock udp as closely as possible
so that integrating it into existing applications and libraries
can be done without introducing too many new changes.
By adding a line in the Makefile, users can choose which
underlying DTLS implementation to use. Swapping to a
new DTLS implementation is simply done by specifying the
corresponding implementation in the Makefile. Through this
mechanism, testing and evaluation of DTLS implementations
can be performed without altering the application.
Figure 2 summarizes the integration of the DTLS abstrac-
tion layer with existing network stack in RIOT. Currently,
RIOT only has support for tinyDTLS1 but there is ongoing
work2 to add support for wolfSSL3.
The use cases of sock dtls are twofold, the
DTLS server and the DTLS client. The server
is created by sock_dtls_create(). Then
it needs to tell the credentials to sock by
sock_dtls_register_credential_tags(). After
the call sock_dtls_init_server() the server is ready
to receive new DTLS session establishment requests from
clients.
DTLS clients also need to create the sock using
sock_dtls_create() and then register the credentials
with sock_dtls_register_credential_tags().
After that, a session to a DTLS server can be established using
sock_dtls_establish_session(). If successful, the
session can be used to send and receive datagram packet like
in a normal UDP channel.
For the DTLS server, the operations can be summarised as
follows:
1) Create sock dtls
2) Register credentials available for use
3) Initialize the server
4) Start listening for incoming datagram packets
1https://projects.eclipse.org/projects/iot.tinydtls
2https://github.com/RIOT-OS/RIOT/pull/10308
3https://www.wolfssl.com
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As for the DTLS client, the first two steps are the same as
for the server followed by
3) Establish session with a DTLS server
4) Start sending and receiving datagram packets
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
We are now ready to validate our concept and assess the
performance of our implementation. We compared sock dtls
with tinyDTLS and sock udp and examine the metrics CPU
overhead and goodput during the transmission of payloads
as well as memory consumption. All measurements were
performed on samr21-xpro boards positioned side-by-side
over the 802.15.4 wireless radio network [7] with 6LoWPAN
encapsulation and header compression [8].
We wrote three versions of a client and a server program
that send packets of increasing payload sizes from the client
to the server while recording the time taken to transmit the
packets. The first version uses tinyDTLS directly while the
second version uses our new DTLS abstraction layer sock dtls
with tinyDTLS. The third version employs no encryption layer
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but plainly uses RIOT UDP sock API sock udp to transmit the
packets and acts as a controlling baseline.
The test was setup as follows unless stated otherwise. The
server is instantiated to listen for new connections and receives
packet from clients. For each received packet, the payload
size is logged into a file. On the client side, two metrics
are measured: the time taken to process a packet for the
full network stack, that is (1) DTLS, UDP, IP, 6LoWPAN,
MAC, and auxiliary components, and (2) the time taken to
process only the DTLS part of the transmission, which starts
from accepting the packet from user and encrypting it using
specified keying materials to just before passing it to UDP
layer for further processing. The test is run with payload size
ranging between 25 Bytes and 300 Bytes in 25 Bytes intervals.
Each configuration is repeated 5000 times with averages and
standard deviations recorded in the following diagrams.
CPU Overhead. Figure 3 depicts the CPU overhead during
packet transmission. The test program using sock dtls and
tinyDTLS need approximately the same average processing
time per packet with sock dtls being slightly higher. The extra
overhead when adding an abstraction layer is expected as a
tradeoff for faster prototyping time and ease of use, which in
this case is virtually negligible. The step-like line shaped for
the full stack processing can be attributed to the fragmentation
of packets by the underlying 6LoWPAN layer when certain
size limits are reached. Comparison of the times taken to
process only the DTLS layer shows an almosts linear line
of the processing time with increasing payload size and again,
there is only little difference between the values.
This clearly indicates that our sock dtls abstraction layer
comes at negligible processing overhead.
Goodput. The average goodput is shown in in Figure 4. It
follows the same trend with the sock dtls version admitting
approximately the same performance values as the tinyDTLS
version. These results not only indicate a picture consistent
with processing, but also confirm the robustness of our inter-
face layer.
Memory. Figure 5 compares the memory consumptions
of the different DTLS code versions. Here we measured the
memory usage of a simple echo client and server application
implemented using sock dtls and tinyDTLS instead of our
test application to mirror a more complete DTLS application
compared to the test application. The hardware setup is the
same.
The RAM usage of both programs is similar with sock dtls
saving around 120 Bytes compared to tinyDTLS. This saving
is mainly contributed by the compiler, which can optimize
away some of the variables used for the sending and receiving
functions in user application but not in tinyDTLS. As a result,
even though we actually need about 80 Bytes more in sock dtls
for credman and the API, we still end up using less RAM.
Nevertheless, because the saving is only around 100 Bytes and
is mainly caused by compiler optimization, we could actually
say that the RAM usage is approximately the same in both
versions and the exact value is determined by the quality of
implementation in user application.
In contrast, the ROM usage in sock dtls is about two
kilobytes larger than in tinyDTLS. The larger ROM size is
due to the code size of sock dtls. This value is implementation
specific as each implementation needs to be implemented
against the DTLS sock interface first before used as the
underlying implementation of sock dtls. When using tiny-
DTLS specifically, we could actually delegate the bulk of
credential management to credman. For tinyDTLS this must be
implemented as callbacks by the users. This simplifies the user
application and actually achieves about the same performance
using less code.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we introduced and analyzed the new DTLS ab-
straction layer designed to be modular and easy for integrating
into existing applications. We demonstrated that the tradeoff
between performance and ease of use is well acceptable for
normal use cases. Leveraging a clean and implementation-
independent interface, we increased the portability of appli-
cations and also the maintainability of upper layer protocol
implementations such as CoAP [9] over time.
In the future, we will work on implementing a DTLS
profile for authentication and authorization for the constrained
environment such as [10] to provide a framework for a
secure network infrastructure. The integration of sock dtls in
upper layer protocols such as the RIOT gcoap4is also on our
schedule.
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